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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 12-2886
___________
JASON SCOTT,
Appellant
v.
UPS SUPPLY CHAIN SOLUTIONS
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1-10-cv-00929)
District Judge: Honorable Richard G. Andrews
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 3, 2013
Before: RENDELL, FISHER and GARTH, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: May 3, 2013)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Jason Scott (“Scott”), proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s opinion
granting summary judgment in favor of Appellee UPS Supply Chain Solutions (“UPS”).
For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s order.

Scott began working for Kelly Services, a temporary staffing agency, in 2000. In
November, 2008, Scott accepted a temporary work assignment from Kelly Services to
perform billing and collections at UPS’ Newark, Delaware office. He executed an
agreement stating that he was an employee of Kelly Services, not UPS. (Dkt. No. 61, Ex.
5, pp. 11-12.) Scott was paid by Kelly Services and reported to a Kelly Services
supervisor. That supervisor was in charge of his vacation and sick leave requests, and
was also the person Scott contacted if he was going to be late or absent from his
assignment at UPS. Scott did not have access to the UPS building and had to be admitted
by the receptionist after ringing a door bell.
Scott was late for, and failed to report to, his UPS assignment on several
occasions. After UPS discovered that he falsified a time entry, Kelly Services advised
Scott that his work assignment at UPS was terminated. He then continued to receive
other work assignments from Kelly Services. Scott, however, believed that he was
terminated from the UPS assignment due to his sexual orientation. He filed a complaint
against UPS alleging that he was subject to discrimination on the basis of gender
stereotyping, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, and on the basis of his
sexual orientation, in violation of the Delaware Discrimination in Employment Act
(“DDEA”). UPS filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Scott could not
prove that he was an employee for purposes of Title VII or the DDEA. By order entered
June 6, 2012, the District Court granted UPS’ motion, and Scott timely appealed.
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review
over a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot,
602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010). Summary judgment is appropriate if, viewing the
record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there are no genuine issues of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 56(c).
We agree with the District Court that the pertinent facts are undisputed. (Dkt. No.
68, p. 8.) The issue is whether the facts establish that Scott was, or was not, an employee
of UPS as a matter of law.1 To assert a claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
Scott must first prove that he was an employee of UPS, and not of Kelly Services, his
temporary staffing agency. See Menkowitz v. Pottstown Mem’l Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 113,
127-28 n.5 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that, as under Title VII, “independent contractors are
not employees within the meaning of the ADEA”). In order to determine whether a
person is an employee for purposes of Title VII, the common law of agency and the
traditional master-servant doctrine applies. See Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503
U.S. 318, 322-24 (1992). To that end, the court should consider
the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the
product is accomplished [;] . . . the skill required; the source of the
instrumentalities and tools; the location of the work; the duration of the
1

Scott does not meaningfully dispute the District Court’s conclusion that he was
not a UPS employee. He only makes the unsupported assertion that the relationship
between Kelly Services and UPS “can be compared to a contractor and subcontractor.”
(Appellant’s Br. at 7.)
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relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the right to
assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s
discretion over when and how long to work; the method of payment; the
hired party’s role in hiring and paying assistants; whether the work is part
of the regular business of the hiring party; whether the hiring party is in
business; the provision of employee benefits; and the tax treatment of the
hired party.
Id. at 323-24 (citations omitted).
The District Court found that, under Darden, Scott was not an employee of UPS.
After reviewing the record, we agree with that assessment. The record demonstrates that
Scott worked for UPS for about ten months; that he remained employed by Kelly
Services after his UPS assignment ended; that Kelly Services determined his rate of pay
and paid him; and that Kelly Services terminated his UPS assignment. Additionally,
Scott applied to Kelly Services, filled out its job application, and signed an
acknowledgement that he was an employee of Kelly Services, not UPS. Kelly Services
was in charge of monitoring his daily attendance, vacation, sick leave, and performance
evaluations. Finally, Scott did not have employee access to the UPS facility, and had to
be admitted by the receptionist every day that he reported to work. The District Court
properly granted UPS’ summary judgment motion because there was no genuine issue of
material fact as to whether Scott was an employee of UPS.2

2

The Title VII standards are virtually identical to those of the DDEA.
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